Subsisting Copyrights and Innocent Infringement by Editors,
SUBSISTING COPYRIGHTS AND
INNOCENT INFRINGEMENT
United States copyright law gives to the author of a literary
work the exclusive right to publish or reproduce his work in any
communication medium.' In order to acquire and maintain this
monopolistic right, each reproduction of the copyrighted material must
contain notice of copyright in the proper form and affixed in the
proper place.' The notice requirement is designed to warn would-be
infringers that the work is protected,8 as well as to differentiate between
those works which may be copied freely and those which can be
reproduced only with the author's permission.' Publication without
the notice or with it but in a defective form can result in forfeiture of
the copyright and thus thrust the work into the public domain.'
The notice requirement presents special problems to the copyright
proprietor since maximum commercial exploitation of a copyrighted
work may require several editions or the production of other versions in
different communication media. Thus a novel may be serialized in a
magazine, printed in several hardback and paperback editions and
dramatized on the stage and in motion pictures before it finally appears
as a late movie on television. Though the owner of the original copy-
right has the right to republish his work and to create and exploit
other versions, he will often license or sell the right to exploit these
commercial opportunities. Each of these later editions or adaptations
of the original work to a different communication medium-termed
"derivative works" q--necessarily includes some or all of the copy-
righted elements of the original work. Just as reissuing a work in the
1 17 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
2 17 U.S.C. § 10 (1964).
3 H. M. Kolbe Co. v. Armgus Textile Co., 315 F.2d 70 (2d Cir. 1963) ; Shapiro,
Bernstein & Co. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 161 F.2d 406 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied,
331 U.S. 820 (1947).
4 Some authors, notably in academic and scientific circles, prefer publishing their
works without copyright to promote dissemination of their ideas. This intentional
waiver of the copyright privilege is considered a "dedication" of the work to the public
domain, as distinguished from an involuntary forfeiture of copyright through failure
to meet the statutory requirements. See National Comics Publications, Inc. v. Fawcett
Publications, 191 F.2d 594, 597-98 (2d Cir. 1951) (L. Hand, J.), opinion clarified,
198 F.2d 927 (2d Cir. 1952).
5 See, e.g., Public Affairs Associates v. Rickover, 284 F.2d 262, 269-71 (D.C.
Cir. 1960), vacated per curiam on other grounds, 369 U.S. 111 (1962) ; Klasmer v.
Baltimore Football, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 255 (D. Md. 1961).
4 A "derivative work" is one, based in whole or in substantial part upon a prior
or "underlying work," which satisfies the requirement of originality and is not itself
an infringing work. NIMMER, COPYRIGHT § 39 (1965). Compare H.R. 4347, 89th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 101 (1965).
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same form as the original work constitutes a publication of that work,7
every derivative work, to the extent that it incorporates material from
the original work, is a publication of the original copyrighted
material.'
The owner of a subsisting copyright' faces particular problems in
the event that the copyright notice on the derivative work is defective
or omitted. Does publication of previously copyrighted material in a
defectively copyrighted derivative work result in forfeiture of the
subsisting copyright? This question has not been extensively litigated,
and the decisions in the cases which have raised the issue are not
wholly consistent. In Bentley v. Tibbals,'° the plaintiff copyrighted
his work in England and the United States. He subsequently pub-
lished a new United States edition which included all the old material
and a substantial amount of new matter which he failed to copyright.
Defendant acquired a copy of the second edition and reprinted it with-
out the author's permission. The court held that the plaintiff could
not enjoin the copying of the second edition even though it contained
a legend that parts of the work had been copyrighted previously. The
stated rationale for the Bentley decision was that "one who so em-
bodies copyrighted with uncopyrighted matter that one reading his
work cannot distinguish between the two has no right to complain
if the book is republished by third parties." " The court did not
purport to decide that the plaintiff had lost his copyright on the first
edition, but rather that he could not enjoin copying of the second
edition. Resolution of the first question would have been necessary
only if the defendant in Bentley had copied solely from the first edition.
However, to hold a copier liable under these facts while finding no
infringement in Bentley would produce the anomalous result that the
author's right to enjoin the reproduction of his work depends upon
the source from which it is copied. In effect, the court's decision in
Bentley deprived the author of his right to the monopolistic exploitation
of his work as fully as if it had expressly held the subsisting copy-
right to have been forfeited.
The question was again presented in Sieff v. Continental Auto
Supply, Inc.12 The plaintiff had published a series of catalogues; new
material in Numbers 470 and 471 was copyrighted and included in
Number 472, which was uncopyrighted. Plaintiff contended that the
"publication of No. 472 without copyright notice 'did not affect the
7 See 17 U.S.C. § 10 (1964) ; Deward & Rich, Inc. v. Bristol Say. & Loan Corp.,
120 F.2d 537, 540 (4th Cir. 1941).
8 Nimma, op. cit. supra note 6, § 57.1.
9 A subsisting copyright is a copyright on the preexisting material (old matter)
which is used in a derivative work. The derivative copyright covers only the new
matter added by the author of the derivative work.
10223 Fed. 247 (2d Cir. 1915).
11 Id. at 256.
12 39 F. Supp. 683 (D. Minn. 1941).
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force or validity of the subsisting copyright . . .,' "I Defendant
countered with the argument that the validity of the subsisting copy-
right on the material previously copyrighted could not be maintained
without notice of copyright. The court agreed and granted summary
judgment for the defendant even though the plaintiff insisted that it did
not intend to abandon the copyright.' Thus, it appears that the
incorporation of previously copyrighted material into a derivative
work must be indicated by an appropriate notice of copyright if the
derivative work is not separately copyrighted. Failure to do so may
result in forfeiture of the subsisting copyright.
The most recent case raising the issue, Grove Press, Inc. v.
Greenleaf Publishing Co., 5 reached an apparently contrary result. The
author, Jean Genet, copyrighted a French language edition of his work
in France in 1949, thus obtaining copyright protection in the United
States under a then existing treaty.' In 1954 he authorized an
English translation of the work which, the court assumed arguendo,"
was not copyrighted in the United States. Defendant obtained this
translation and copied it. In an infringement suit he contended that
the translation, which was produced with the consent of the author,
necessarily included the novel, and that the novel as translated was
automatically thrust into the public domain since it was not copy-
righted in this country.' The court rejected this claim and held that
the copying of an uncopyrighted translation infringed the original 1949
copyright. The rationale was that the defendant copied not only the
words of the translation but also the plot, characters and dialogue of
the original work, thus infringing the subsisting copyright.
9
The Grove Press court also developed a second rationale. While
conceding that the translation was in the public domain, the court
stated that the failure of the translator to obtain copyright protection
for his work would not be fatal to the subsisting copyright unless the
author consented to such dedication. 20 The court then examined the
13 Id. at 686.
14 Ibid.
15 247 F. Supp. 518 (E.D.N.Y. 1965).
I6GSee 17 U.S.C. §§9(b)-(c) (1964) for the text of the statutory provisions
concerning treaties. The present copyright treaty between the United States and
France is the Uniform Copyright Convention, which is reproduced at 17 U.S.C.
§ 9(c) (1964).
17 Grove Press, Inc. v. Greenleaf Publishing Co., 247 F. Supp. 518, 523 n.6
(E.D.N.Y. 1965).
'8Id. at 524. In 1952 five pages of the translation were published for the first
time in a copyrighted anthology. Plaintiff contended that the copyright on these
five pages was incorporated into and protected the full translation when it was pub-
lished without copyright. The court had denied equitable relief based upon this claim
in an earlier opinion. Grove Press, Inc. v. Greenleaf Publishing Co., 247 F. Supp.
127 (E.D.N.Y. 1965).
'9 247 F. Supp. at 524-25.
20 d. at 527.
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contract between the author and the translator and noted that it did
not permit the translator to sell the work in the United States or
England, and that each copy was required to carry a notice to that
effect. These contract provisions, the court concluded, indicated that
the author did not intend to abandon his work to the public, and that
the legend in each copy was a sufficient indication of the existence of a
subsisting copyright."
Grove Press seems indistinguishable from both Bentley and
Sieff, for these cases all involved previously copyrighted material
subsequently published in an uncopyrighted derivative work; yet
Grove Press reached a result arguably contrary to the other cases.
These cases may be reconciled on the basis of the nature of the
copyrighted material incorporated into the uncopyrighted derivative
work. Both Bentley and Sieff involved the incorporation of
copyrighted material into a larger uncopyrighted work,22 in such
a way that it would be impossible for a reader to determine which
portions had been copyrighted previously. Since one purpose of the
copyright law is to discriminate between works which may be copied
freely and those which are protected,' these cases may stand for the
proposition that one who incorporates copyrighted material into a
larger uncopyrighted work so that the two are indistinguishable will
be held to have forfeited the copyright on the incorporated material.
This rationale avoids placing on the copier the burden of sorting the
copyrighted "wheat" from the uncopyrighted "chaff." Viewed in
this light, Bentley and Sieff are reconcilable with Grove Press for in
the latter case the copier was warned that the derivative work followed
21 Id. at 527-28. The legend stated:
Publishing in agreement with the Librairie Gallimard.
The present translation follows the original and only complete text,
though it incorporates a few footnotes which the author added to the later
edition.
Copyright 1954 by B. Frechtman and The Olympia Press, Paris.
On the back cover the translation carried the notation "Not to be sold in the U.S.A.
or U.K." Id. at 521. The court in a prior opinion indicated that this notation may
have been "intended as the semantic equivalent of the then widely-sought-for literary
accolade, 'Banned in Boston."' Grove Press, Inc. v. Greenleaf Publishing Co., 247
F. Supp. 127, 133 n.9 (E.D.N.Y. 1965).
In Bentley the derivative work also contained warning, perhaps even more ex-
plicit, of the presence of a subsisting copyright. The legend proclaimed: "This Code
includes the Telegraph Cyphers entered according to act of Congress in the year 1906,
by E. I. Bentley in the office of the Librarian of Congress at Washington, D.C.
All rights reserved. Entered at Stationer's Hall." Bentley v. Tibbals, 223 Fed. 247,
250 (2d Cir. 1915). Yet this warning was not sufficient to permit plaintiff to enjoin
defendant's copying.
22 In Bentley, the second edition was a revised and enlarged version of the first
work. 223 Fed. at 250. Sieff involved only some one hundred copyrighted items in
the catalogue. 39 F. Supp. at 685.
2 3 See text accompanying note 4 supra.
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the original French novel, which was protected by a copyright.24
Hence, there was no real mixing of copyrighted with uncopyrighted
material, and the subsisting copyright was not forfeited.
Reconciling the cases on this basis, however, raises a question as
to the correctness of the Grove Press decision. If copying the trans-
lation infringed the copyright on the original French novel, it must
be because the translation is "substantially similar to" the original
copyrighted work. 5 The question remains whether publication of the
translation without notice causes a forfeiture of the subsisting copy-
right. 6 Obviously, a translation is not a copy in the literal sense of
the word since it contains the original work of the translator. This
new matter contributed by the translator may be separately copy-
righted. Hence it may be argued that since the translator could only
copyright the new matter he contributed, the failure to copyright it
could cause the forfeiture of only the new matter, leaving the old
matter protected by the subsisting copyright. 28  This approach, how-
ever, emphasizes form over substance, for the very purpose of a trans-
lation is to take what has been expressed in one language and transfer
it to another, while preserving the original author's style and artistry.
Only the word forms change, while what is being expressed-the plot,
the theme and the development of the characters-remains the same.
In this essential respect a translation is a copy of the original even
though it contains the effort of the translator. Holding that publica-
tion of an uncopyrighted translation does not forfeit the subsisting
copyright extends copyright protection to the new matter in the trans-
lation, for it is impossible to copy the words of the translation without
copying the format and other copyrighted elements of the derivative
work. Thus, the translation is protected from infringement even
though it is uncopyrighted. This approach also places a heavy burden
on copiers, for omission of the copyright notice makes it difficult accu-
rately to determine if parts of a work are protected by a copyright.' It
is therefore possible for a copier unknowingly to expose himself to
heavy penalties for an innocent infringement of a subsisting copyright.
Moreover, in this situation the owner of the subsisting copyright is
able to protect himself, by requiring the derivative owner either to
copyright his work or to indemnify in the event of forfeiture or
24There was also a legend indicating a subsisting copyright in Bentley, see
note 21 supra, but unlike Grove Press, large parts of the second edition in Bentley
could be copied without taking material that had been previously copyrighted.
25See Nimmmz, op. cit. supra note 6, §143.
26 See generally id. §§ 82-88.
2717 U.S.C. § 7 (1964).
28 See G. Ricordi & Co. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 189 F.2d 469 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 342 U.S. 849 (1951).
29This problem of distinguishing between the copyrighted and the uncopyrighted
material may explain the Betley and Sieff cases. See text accompanying notes 22-24
ip ra.
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infringement of the subsisting copyright.3' There are therefore cogent
arguments for holding that the publication of an uncopyrighted de-
rivative work which is substantially similar to the subsisting work
should forfeit the subsisting copyright.
Both a determination that the subsisting copyright is forfeited and
the Grove Press rationale have undesirable consequences. In the first
situation a subsisting copyright owner may lose all copyright pro-
tection through the negligence of his licensee. Since the work may
be produced in several different media at the same time, the possibility
of error by any one licensee is increased. Furthermore, the subsisting
copyright proprietor would have only one remedy-breach of con-
tract-and the computation of damages may be highly speculative. The
copyright proprietor therefore might not be fully compensated for the
loss of his copyright. On the other hand, the Grove Press rationale
exposes an innocent infringer to the possibility of unknowingly infring-
ing a subsisting copyright, as well as extending copyright protection to
a derivative work even though it is uncopyrighted.
A third alternative eliminates many of the undesirable conse-
quences of both the Sieff and Grove Press resolutions. Section 21
of the copyright statute" provides that accidental omission of notice
of copyright from a particular copy or copies will not forfeit the
copyright if the owner has attempted to comply with statutory require-
ments, but it will prevent recovery of damages from an innocent in-
fringer who was misled by the omission of notice. A permanent in-
junction will not be granted, however, unless the innocent infringer is
reimbursed for his reasonable out-of-pocket expenses. Section 21 pre-
serves the copyright without exposing the innocent copier to heavy
penalties for infringement. However, the section is of limited appli-
cability for it applies only when there has been an accidental omission
of notice from a small number of copies, and it does not speak directly
to the problem of innocent infringement of subsisting copyrights.
The approach of section 21 has been adopted and expanded by
the congressional committee which is contemplating revision of present
copyright law. Section 404(a) of the proposed revision' provides
that the omission of notice of copyright from a copyrighted work will
not invalidate the copyright if the work is registered " within five years
S0 See National Comics Publications, Inc. v. Fawcett Publications, Inc., 191 F.2d
594, 600-01 (2d Cir. 1951) (L. Hand, J.), opinion clarified, 198 F.2d 927 (2d Cir.
1952) American Press Ass'n v. Daily Story Publishing Co., 120 Fed. 766, 768-69
(7th Cir. 1902), appeal dismissed, 193 U.S. 675 (1903). See also HowELL, Copy-
RIGHT LAW 71 (rev. ed. Latman 1962).
3117 U.S.C. § 21 (1964).
32H.R. 4347, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. §404(a) (1965).
33 Under the proposed statute, as under the present law, a copyright proprietor
must inform the Copyright Office that he is claiming copyright protection for certain
published material. No suit for infringement can be brought until the work is
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after its initial publication and the copyright proprietor makes a reason-
able effort to add notice to all copies after the omission is discovered.
Since the absence of notice will not automatically place the work in the
public domain, section 404(b) " provides for a limitation of remedies in
cases of innocent infringement without notice of copyright. If an
infringer is misled by the omission of notice, he will be liable only
for the statutory damages contained in section 504(c) .5 And if the
infringement occurs before the work is registered, the copyright pro-
prietor is precluded from recovering statutory damages unless the work
is registered within three months after its first publication.36 Thus in
most cases the sole remedy for innocent infringement is an injunction.
If the injunction is granted, the copyright proprietor may be required
to reimburse the infringer for the latter's reasonable expenses. Or
the court may deny the injunction and require the copyright proprietor
to license the copier to produce the infringing work, but at a reasonable
royalty.S7 The proposed revision liberalizes the notice requirement and
provides a more flexible statutory scheme for fashioning remedies
against innocent infringers. If enacted, the statute would give copy-
right proprietors in situations like Bentley and Sieff the opportunity
to register their works within five years, and thus rectify the original
omission of notice.
The revision leaves unanswered the crucial question whether, and
to what extent, the subsisting copyright is impaired by failure of the
derivative owner to fulfill notice and registration requirements. This
question can be answered by balancing the two competing interests of
copyright law-protecting the copyright proprietor's monopoly and
registered. H.R. 4347, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 407-11 (1965). See also 17 U.S.C. §§ 11,
13 (1964). Notice of copyright must be placed on the published material to warn
copiers that the work is protected, and notice is a separate requirement from registra-
tion. See H.R. 4347, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. § 401 (1965). See also 17 U.S.C. § 10 (1964).
a4 H.R. 4347, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. § 404(b) (1965).
35H.RL 4347, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. §504(c) (1965). Section 504(a) provides:
Except as otherwise provided by this title, an infringer of copyright is liable
for either: (1) the copyright owner's actual damages and any additional
profits of the infringer, as provided by section (b) ; or (2) statutory damages,
as provided by section (c).
Section 404(b) creates an exception to that rule:
Any person who innocently begins an undertaking that infringes a copyright
incurs no liability for damages or profits under section 504 if he proves that
he was misled by the omission of notice ....
If the word "damages" in § 404(b) is construed to include actual damages and statu-
tory damages, as defined in § 504(c), then an innocent infringer will incur no liability.
However, it appears more likely that "damages" in § 404(b) refers only to actual
damages, for § 504(c) (2) states:
In a case where the infringer sustains the burden of proving that he was
not aware and had no reason to believe that his acts constituted an infringe-
ment of copyright, the court in its discretion may reduce the award of statu-
tory damages to a sum of not less than $100.
This statement implies that statutory damages are proper even in cases of innocent
infringement.
36 H.R. 4347, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. § 411(2) (1965).
a3 H.R. 4347, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. § 404(b) (1965).
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limiting the liability of an innocent infringer. These interests are
best reconciled by expanding section 21 of the present copyright
statute" s to include innocent infringement of subsisting copyrights.
Thus, in the situation where a subsisting copyright is infringed by
the copying of an uncopyrighted derivative work, the original copyright
would not be forfeited, but the copyright proprietor would be remitted
to limited remedies against the infringer. Such an approach has been
included in the proposed copyright revision to mitigate the harsh
penalties that presently obtain for failure to include notice of copyright,
and thus it would be consistent with the new statute. To remedy the
failure of the present statute and the proposed revision to deal specif-
ically with the problems of subsisting copyrights, section 404 of the
proposed statute should be amended to provide: (1) publication of an
uncopyrighted derivative work does not affect the validity of any
subsisting copyrights; and (2) one who innocently infringes a sub-
sisting copyright by copying a derivative work shall be considered an
innocent infringer within the terms of proposed section 404(b).
If these suggested amendments are included in the proposed re-
vision, the subsisting copyright proprietor's rights would depend upon
the infringer's knowledge of the subsisting copyright. Thus, though
the derivative work may not be protected, the subsisting copyright
owner will have an independent cause of action against the copier. In
most cases this cause of action will be limited to the remedies for
innocent infringement since it is unlikely that an innocent infringer of a
derivative work will have notice of the subsisting copyright. 9
Giving the subsisting copyright owner an independent cause of
action creates the possibility that the copying of a derivative work will
infringe both the derivative and subsisting copyrights." The extent
of the copier's liability will depend upon whether he can prove that he
was an innocent infringer with respect to one or both of the copy-
rights. In those situations where the infringement is not innocent,
there is no problem in fashioning remedies, for each copyright owner
will prosecute his independent cause of action. However, when both
of the copyrights are innocently infringed, two important questions are
posed: are both copyright owners entitled to the maximum statutory
damages provided by section 404(b); and who bears the cost of reim-
bursing the copier for his expenses or, alternatively, who receives the
3817 U.S.C. §21 (1964).
39 Both Bentley and Grove Press contained notices indicating a subsisting copy-
right. See note 21 supra. Under the proposed revision if a derivative work is reg-
istered, the registration should indicate all subsisting copyrights. H.R. 4347, 89th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 408(9) (1965). If requested, the Copyright Office would furnish
this information. H.R. 4347, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. § 705(c) (1965).
40 See Wihtol v. Crow, 309 F.2d 777, 781 (8th Cir. 1962).
41 The copyright proprietor whose material was innocently infringed will have
the choice of requesting the court to grant an injunction or the compulsory license.




royalties from the compulsory license? With regard to the first ques-
tion, it might be argued that both copyright proprietors should be able
to recover damages up to the statutory maximum since each has an
independent cause of action. However, the purpose of section 404(b)
is to limit the liability of an innocent infringer; consonant with this
purpose the total amount of any recovery from an innocent infringer
should be limited to the maximum set in the statute regardless of the
number of copyrights infringed. Any such recovery could then be
allocated among the various copyright proprietors whose copyrights
were infringed.
A more difficult problem arises under section 404(b) if the court
grants an injunction or uses the compulsory licensing procedure. The
issue then posed is who should reimburse the copier for his expenses,
or who should receive the royalties. In view of the myriad fact pat-
terns which could arise involving infringement of derivative and sub-
sisting copyrights, it would be difficult to state any statutory rule
applicable to a majority of cases.42 The proposed revision allows the
court considerable discretion in fashioning remedies.' Perhaps the
best solution would be judicial resolution of these questions according
to the equities of the particular situation. However, some guidelines
can be suggested. One would be the extent and nature of the injuries
produced by the infringement; that is, does the infringement preempt
the market for the derivative work or for the original work? A second
criterion-which copyright owner has the right to license the copier to
produce the infringing work-could be employed in combination with
the first. Both of these considerations are designed to determine which
party has the greater interest in halting the infringement, and then
designating that copyright owner either to reimburse the copier for his
expenses or to receive the royalties depending upon the remedy the
court chooses.
All of the suggested changes are intended to remedy the failure
of the proposed statute to deal with the problem of subsisting copy-
rights. Their adoption will clarify an inadequately charted area of
the law and rectify an unfortunate omission in the proposed statute.
42 The fact situations could vary depending upon whether the infringing work
was a copy of the derivative work, or another version based upon the derivative work,
such as a play developed from a translation, which infringes both the derivative and
the underlying work. Other factors would be the extent of the derivative copyright
owner's license, and whether the subsisting copyright owner was receiving a per-
centage from the derivative owner's sales or whether he sold his rights for a lump sum.
43 See H.R. 4347, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 404(b), 502(a), 504(c) (1965). The
court has similar discretion under present law. See 17 U.S.C. §§21, 101(b) (1964).
